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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
LORENZO J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
DOUGLAS E. BAGLEY, 
Defendant and Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
I. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This matter was properly referred to the above-captioned Court 
by the Supreme Court of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated <78-
2a-3(2)(j). 
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 • 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are two rules of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which come 
under scrutiny and are applicable to these proceedings, namely Rule 
15(a) and Rule 56(a) and 56(b). Both rules are set forth in full 
in the attached addendum. 
* 
* 
Case No. 900454-CA 
* Priority 16 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND ISSUES 
Plaintiff brought an action in the Third District Court for 
collection of a promissory note. Plaintiff asserted that the 
subject note was a "joint and several" liability of Mr. Bagley and 
a corporation, namely "Oncor Sound, Inc". Plaintiff chose not to 
include Oncor Sound, Inc. as a party to the action. Mr. Bagley 
defended and asserted that the subject promissory note was signed 
in a corporate capacity and there was no personal liability 
attached thereto. The trial court agreed with defendant's position 
and dismissed the cause of action brought by plaintiff. Plaintiff 
has brought the present appeal. 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On or about November 6, 1984, plaintiff's agent/son drafted 
and submitted to defendant for signature a note which contained the 
signature line as follows: 
Oncor Sound, Inc. 
President 
Mr. Bagley (appellee herein) being president of Oncor Sound, 
Inc. executed the promissory note where indicated. Almost five 
years later, plaintiff/appellant initiated the action for 
collection on the note, against Mr. Bagley personally, which action 
has led to the appeal herein. 
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Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the 
fact that the subject note was signed solely in a corporate 
capacity and there was no basis for individual liability. The 
trial court agreed with that interpretation, granted the motion for 
summary judgment, and the appeal herein ensued. 
Both parties agree that the underlying note is not ambiguous, 
and Appellee asserts that the subject note was signed solely in a 
corporate capacity, and therefore the decision of the trial court 
was a proper one. 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to 
grant the Motion to Amend the original complaint. Appellee did not 
respond to such motion and the court denied such motion on the 
basis that the complaint had already been dismissed, and therefore 
there was no complaint before the Court to amend. Appellant's sole 
remedy to allege some alter ego theory would be to file a new, 
independent action with the court. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT MADE A FACTUAL DETERMINATION 
AS TO THE AMBIGUITY OF THE NOTE, AND ITS 
DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 
Both parties to this action have asserted throughout the 
proceedings that the underlying note is not ambiguous and should 
therefore be interpreted by the specific terms thereof. Cross-
motions for summary judgment were filed with the trial court. The 
trial court determined that the note was in fact not ambiguous and 
3 
appellant's complaint against the individual appellee must be 
dismissed. 
The Courts have held on numerous occasions that even though 
the parties to a contract have a completely different 
interpretation of certain terms or conditions of a contract, that 
in and of itself, does not make a contract or the terms thereof 
ambiguous. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 
(Utah 1988); Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, (Utah 1980); Land v. 
Land, 605 P.2d 1248, (Utah 1980). 
The trial court made a determination that the note was not 
ambiguous and its decision is not subject to reversal by this 
court. 
B. THE SUBJECT CONTRACT WAS BETWEEN A 
CORPORATION AND APPELLANT, WITH 
NO PERSONAL LIABILITY TO APPELLEE 
Appellant has attempted to circumvent the laws of corporate 
insulation by asserting that the subject contract was a "joint and 
several obligation", but such assertion will not withstand scrutiny 
of the many precedents determined before it, as set forth 
hereafter. 
It is undisputed that the terms of the contract showed Rene 
Taylor, agent for Lorenzo Jones Taylor was the obligee and Oncor 
Sound, Inc. was the obligor under such contract. The name of 
Douglas Bagley did not appear anywhere on the contract, until such 
time as Mr. Bagley affixed his name above the printed line, 
indicating "President" of Oncor Sound, Inc. 
In the present matter, the only conceivable argument made by 
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Appellant showing personal liability by Mr. Bagley, is that he did 
not sign his name in a corporate capacity. The failure of an 
officer signing a contract, to affix his corporate title is not 
fatal to the validity of a corporate contract, especially in those 
instances where the contract on its face is a contract of the 
corporation, and the other parties have notice of the officer's 
relation to the corporation. The contract will be upheld, despite 
the officer's failure to add his title. Trident Construction 
Company v. West Electric, Inc. 776 P2d. 1239, (Nevada 1989); 
Kenneally v. First National Bank of Anoka, 400 F.2d 838, 841 (8th 
Cir. 1968). There can be no dispute that Mr. Bagley affixed his 
name to the subject contract as president of Oncor Sound, Inc. 
The Court's have gone even further in protecting individual 
signators by holding that an individual acting within the scope of 
authority for the corporation cannot be held personally liable upon 
a contract signed by him on behalf of the corporation, so long as 
notice has been given that he is acting for the corporation or the 
identity of the corporation has been disclosed. Bidwell v. Jolley, 
716 P.2d 481 (Colo. App. 1986). The face of the contract indicates 
Oncor Sound, Inc. as the obligor. There is only one signature line 
for the "President" of Oncor Sound, Inc. There is no other 
reference on the contract that an individual who signs said 
contract is liable upon the terms thereof. The monies were 
received and distributed by the corporation. 
In 1984 the Supreme Court of Utah was faced with a similar 
factual scenario in Marveon Sign Company v. Roennebeck, 694 P.2d 
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604. In that case an invoice was made out to "Fred Roennbeck, 
Precious Coins". There was a blank signature line with the words 
"authorized signature" printed below. Myrna Roennbeck, the wife of 
Fred Roennebeck signed the invoice, and a suit was brought against 
her personally for nonpayment of the invoice. The court held that 
the printed words under the signature line implied and indicated 
that she was signing only as an authorized representative of the 
company and was not personally obligated. In the instant case, the 
same determination has been made by the court. Mr. Bagley signed 
only in his representative capacity, and since Oncor Sound, Inc. 
was not made a party to the action, the Court acted properly in 
dismissing the complaint. 
In setting forth the liability of parties, Utah Code 
Annotated, §70A-3-403(2)(a) and 403(3) states as follows: 
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name 
to an instrument (a) is personally obligated if the 
instrument neither names the person represented nor shows 
that the representative signed in a representative 
capacity; 
(3) Except as otherwise established, the name of an 
organization preceded or followed by the name and office 
of an authorized individual is a signature made in a 
representative capacity. 
From the foregoing it is easily discernable that the court 
made the proper decision in finding that the subject contract was 
a contract between Oncor Sound, Inc. and Appellant, and the 
signature affixed to such contract was only as a corporate officer. 
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C. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY DOES 
NOT EXIST 
Appellant place great emphasis and reliance in the matter of 
Fidelity Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bismarck Investment Corp., 547 P.2d 
212, (Utah 1976), wherein the court determined that it was not 
necessary to wait for the resolution of a bankruptcy to proceed 
against one of the joint obligors. In Fidelity Deposit, there was 
no dispute and no disagreement that joint and several liability 
existed. The dispute before the court was whether or not the 
plaintiff could proceed against one of the joint obligors while the 
other obligors were protected from the automatic stay provisions of 
the bankruptcy court. The present case can be distinguished from 
the foregoing in that Appellee has maintained throughout that he is 
not a joint obligor, and the only source of remedy available to 
Appellant is to proceed against Oncor Sound, Inc. 
D. THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO AMEND THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT 
Appellant asserts that the Court acted improperly in failing 
to allow the amendment of the original complaint to add a new cause 
of action against Appellee on the basis of some sort of alter ego 
theory. 
Appellant chose the course of action and procedures that he 
determined to follow in this case. Once the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was before the Court
 f there was an obligation by the Court 
to make a decision upon said motion. On April 4, 1990, Appellant 
requested a decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court 
responded to such request and denied Appellant's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
April 16, 1990, almost two weeks after the requested decision for 
Summary Judgment, Appellant requested a decision on the Motion to 
Amend, The Court, upon receipt, determined that since the original 
complaint had already been dismissed pursuant to previous Requests 
for Decision, there was no complaint before the Court to amend, 
and properly denied such Motion to Amend. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a) provides that 
amendment of pleadings is an affirmative policy that should be 
freely given when justice so requires. Of course, the amendment of 
pleadings or the allowance by the Court to do so is not a 
mechanical absolute and the circumstances and terms upon which such 
leave is to be "freely given" is committed to the informed, careful 
judgment and discretion of the trial judge. Lone Star Motor Import, 
Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Nichols v. State, 554 P2d. 231 (Utah 
1976) held that an order of dismissal of a complaint for failure to 
state a claim for relief is a final adjudication and thereafter 
plaintiff may not file an amended complaint. The Court went on to 
caution that if the moving party desired to amend their pleadings, 
they should request that such an order of the Court allow an 
amendment thereof. In the instant case, the order was submitted 
and signed by the Court without objection from Appellant. In 
addition, Appellant made no alternative request for decision in 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Appellee asserts and states 
that the decision of the trial court was a proper decision, and 
such decision should not be disturbed by the Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .ff^day of October, 1990. 
'. ENGLAND 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. 
(a.) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served orf if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading 
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave 
of court or by written consent o the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall 
plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be 
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon 
all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to 
all or any part thereof. 
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